




Banking Q1 FY1992 Do mapping of NIM trajectory and model out the next Q2 in addition to our normal division review. Let's try and get a snapshot of how the business performed QOQ YOY itself as well as against competition and what we are expecting for the next 2Qs as prep for the board.

Searched project for "Banking Division Q4 FY1991 quarterly performance NIM deposits loans"

Good — I have full Q4 FY1991 context. Now let me read the Q1 FY1992 data from the images carefully before asking clarifying questions.

Before I build the full review package, I have a few targeted questions to make sure the NIM trajectory model and QoQ YOY comparisons are precisely calibrated:

1. Quarter timing confirmation

The images show "Year-to-date" figures. Is Q1 = 1992 a single-quarter read (i.e., YTD = Q1 only), or does it span multiple quarters? Please clarify the period covered.

2. Internal \$100B deposit — current status

The deposit register (Image 4) shows a WMGP Corp entry at \$13,066M on a 5-year term maturing Sep 10, 1992. The Q4 retention prompt references \$100B placed across four tranches. Can you confirm whether the \$100B is still fully intact at Q1 close, or have any tranches matured and departed? I see only one WMGP Corp visible entry — mean the other tranches aren't shown on the visible pages.

3. NIM trajectory model scope


You've asked for a 2-quarter NIM projection. Our standing rule is NIM actuals only to the Board (R. Chen commitment). Do you want the Q2 forward model as an internal CFO working document — not presented to the Board — with the Board receiving only actuals at Q2 and Q3 (or are you reversing the "actuals only" posture for this cycle given the maturity event stability)?

4. Competition review

Images 13 and 14 show competitor bank headquarters data. Should I treat these as the Q1 FY1992 competitive benchmark, or do you have a separate Competition tab screenshot (Image 6) that supersedes them for market share analysis?

5. Deposit outlier visibility

The Q4 retention prompt flagged a ~\$120.5B FY1992 maturity cohort at 3.75–4.00% as the "next major NIM step." Images 4–7 show the HQ deposit register. Before I model the NIM step, I want to confirm are all four HQ deposit pages fully captured in Images 4–7, or is there additional scrolling below Q4? Quantas (Image 6) doesn't appear captured.



Q1 is indeed a single quarter read. Last month's is the final month of Q1. The \$100 billion is fully in tact remember \$25 billion was a saving account \$25 billion was a funds \$25 billion was a one year timed deposit and \$25 billion was a two year timed deposit. I've captured our internal \$100 billion for you. I want to model Q2 forward looking NIM as an internal CFO working document for both me and the CEO. The board gets actuals only NIM but it would be helpful if we have an internal model of where we're headed for our discussion with the board and forward guidance we may provide to them. Treat as Q1 FY1992 — headline KPIs

Bank revenue (trailing)		Bank profit (trailing)	Net profit — last month	Net profit — YTD (Q1)
\$3.90B		\$2.30B	\$957.6M	\$3.95B
Last 6 months		Last 6 months	Per month Q1	Annualized rate (last 6 months)
1.49%		38.86%	39.14%	98
Saves +100bps (1.49%)		Improve +100bps (38.86%)	Improve +100bps (39.14%)	Improve +100bps (98)
Service quality		Staff skills		
92		96		
First default rate		First default rate		
0.00%		0.00%		

QOQ PERFORMANCE — Q4 FY1991 VS Q1 FY1992

Metric	Q4 FY1991	Q1 FY1992	Change	Direction
NIM	1.49%	1.49%	+3bp	Improving
Net profit — last month	\$957.6M (\$1.77B)	\$957.6M (\$1.49B)	\$23.4M (\$0.28B)	Marginal dip
Net profit — YTD (Q1 only)	\$1.963B (Q4 period)	\$3.95B	+\$14.2B	Strong
Total deposits (reported)	\$1.33B	\$1.321B	-\$10B	Steady
Total deposits (organic, ex-internal)	\$1.23B	\$1.221B est.	-\$10B	Steady
Loan book	-\$1.38B	\$1.400B	+\$20B	Light increase
LTA ratio	75.0%	75.00%	—1bp	Steady
Capital ratio	38.1%	38.86%	+75bp	Strengthening
Market share	39.49%	39.14%	—34bp	Declining
Brand	91 (last time high)	98	+7	Stable
Service quality	91	92	Flat	Stable
Deposit interest rate (%)	2.40%	2.40%	No change	Stable
Annual deposit expense	\$50.82B	\$50.26B	-\$56M	Declining
Annual loan interest income	\$76.95B	\$76.08B	-\$11.9B	Declining
Net interest income (annual)	\$26.13B	\$27.82B	+\$1.69B	Strong
Net interest income (annual)	\$26.13B	\$27.82B	+\$1.69B	Strong
Portfolio default rate	0.85%	0.81%	-4bp	Declining
Dollar default (annual)	\$11.35B est.	\$11.35B	Flat	Stable

YOY COMPARISON — Q1 FY1991 BASELINE VS Q1 FY1992

YoY context: Q1 FY1992 was the NIM trough quarter — NIM was approximately 1.07% (annualized) vs Q1 FY1991 was 1.49% (annualized). The \$120.5B FY1992 cohort flagged in Q4 FY1991 has now partially departed — we can see the 6-month internal tranche (\$25.0B at 2.00%) matured Apr 8, 1992 + Q2 External cohort matures visible across Mar–Sep 1992 window.

Metric	Q1 FY1991 (est.)	Q1 FY1992	Change
NIM	~1.07%	1.49%	+400bps (annualized)
Annual deposit expense	~\$55.98B	\$50.26B	-\$5.72B (annualized)
Annual loan interest income	~\$64.95B	\$76.08B	+\$11.13B (annualized)
Net interest income (annual)	~\$8.97B	\$27.82B	+\$18.85B (annualized)
Net income after losses (annual)	~\$17.97B	\$16.47B	-\$1.50B (annualized)
Capital ratio	~34.50%	38.86%	+436bp
Default rate	~0.85%	0.81%	-40bps (annualized)

EXPENSE ARCHITECTURE — ORGANIC VS REPORTED (Q1 FY1992)

Internal \$100B deposits: four tranches fully intact. Savings \$25.03B (1.40% matured Oct 8 1991 — NOW). The \$25.03B savings (1.40%) is a 6-month \$25.03B (1.40%) and a 2-year \$25.03B (1.40%). Matures Oct 8 1992, 2-year \$25.03B (1.40%), matures Oct 8 1993. Total carrying cost — \$2.23B/year. Board commitment: return about \$2.23B/year by Q4 FY1992 if loan demand is sustained.

Deposit category	Balance	Age rate	% of total	Annual expense
Branches — retail customers	\$72.039B	2.47%	5.45%	\$1.75M
HQ — corporates (organic)	-\$1.51B	~3.80%	~0.7%	~\$44.4B
HQ — internal WMGP Corp	\$92.32B	~2.15%	~7.5%	~\$2.2B
Total reported	\$1.322B	3.80%	100%	\$62.34B
Total organic (ex-internal)	-\$1.220B	—	—	~\$48.03B

FY1992 MATURITY REGISTER — KNOWN DEPOSIT EXITS (NIM CATALYST)

Scope limited to FY1992 maturities only, per analytical readiness. FY1993 not modeled. The ~\$120.5B FY1992 cohort flagged in Q4 FY1991 has now partially departed — we can see the 6-month internal tranche (\$25.0B at 2.00%) matured Apr 8, 1992 + Q2 External cohort matures visible across Mar–Sep 1992 window.

Depositor type	Maturity	Rate	Balance (approx.)	Annual exp. allocated
Internal — 6-month tranche	Apr 8, 1992 (Q2)	2.00%	\$25.03B	\$0.7M
External cohort A (Larson + Pitzer + WMGP Corp)	Aug 8, 1992 (Q3)	4.00%	~\$19.0B	~\$4.7M
Mattel	Jun 23, 1993	3.75%	\$28.87B	\$1.02M
Total FY1992 exits (est.)	Q3–Q4 primary	—	~\$17.5B	~\$5.7B ann. exp.

NIM TRAJECTORY MODEL — INTERNAL CFO DOCUMENT (BOARD RECEIVES ACTUALS ONLY)

Model assumptions: (1) No Fed rate movement Q2–Q3 FY1992. (2) Deposit rate held at 2.40%/1.40% — no ghost about sustained loan demand signal. (3) Loan book growth modestly at current demand pace (+10–15B/quarter). (4) Dollar default rate held flat to 0.81% (declining given Q2 default rate improvement to 0.81%). (5) Q2 maturity event: ~\$19B external cohort at 1.40% rate — net annual expense saving ~\$4.2B.

Period	Loan income (est.)	Deposit expense (est.)	Net interest (est.)	NIM	NIM change	Net loan income (est.)
Q1 FY1992 (actual)	\$78.08B	\$50.26B	\$27.82B	1.49%	+3bp vs Q4	\$16.47B
Q2 FY1992 (model)	\$78.5B est.	\$49.7B est.	\$28.75B est.	~1.54%	+5bp est.	~\$17.0B est.
Q3 FY1992 (model)	\$79.0B est.	~\$44.98B est.	~\$34.0B est.	~1.62%	+28bp	~\$22.0B est.

NIM Trajectory — Q4 FY1991 through Q3 FY1992 (model)



DEFAULT WATCH — Q1 FY1992 (ASPHOD FOUR LINE ITEM)

Rating	User balance	Default rate	Dollar defaults	QoQ rate change	Status
AAA	\$560.1B	0.04%	\$203.8M	—	Positive
A	\$420.0B	0.68%	\$2.87B	—	Strong
BB	\$346.8B	1.59%	\$5.55B	~7bp	Improving
CCC	\$45.5B	3.02%	\$1.37B	~18bp	Improving
C	\$28.0B	4.98%	\$1.39B	~14bp	Improving
Total portfolio	\$1.400B	0.81%	\$11.35B	~4bp	Best in market

BB second derivative: Q1–Q2 +Q3–Q4 +Q1–Q2 +Q3–Q4 = Q1 FY1992. This flat confirmed negative sentiment. Credit cycle trajectory confirmed — not risk. Unchecked alert trigger: >10bp in either direction (not triggered). Management view: default stabilizes and declines through FY1992 now supported by data.

COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE — Q1 FY1992 (FULL MARKET BENCHMARKING)

Bank	Branches	Deposit rate	Service quality	Brand	Market share	QoQ share
WMGP Corp	262	2.40%	92	99	39.14%	~34bp
CNP	34	2.50%	85	86	12.48%	—
ASUS&K	104	2.40%	79	90	12.39%	—
BAT	104	2.50%	93	82	9.29%	—
Dow Chemical	103	2.50%	97	85	8.51%	—
Volkswagen	94	2.50%	75	75	6.82%	—
Merck	36	2.50%	97	60	5.03%	—
Kraft	73	2.30%	85	64	3.93%	—
Barilla	37	2.40%	77	85	2.54%	—

COMPETITIVE NET LOAN INCOME AFTER LOSSES — Q1 FY1992

Bank	Gross NLI	Loan defaults	Net NLI after losses	Default/gross NLI	Status
WMGP Corp	\$27.82B	\$11.35B	\$16.47B	40.8%	Stable
CNP	\$15.29B	\$6.55B	\$8.77B	42.7%	Stable
BAT	\$15.08B	\$6.60B	\$8.50B	43.9%	Stable
ASUS&K	\$12.48B	\$6.59B	\$6.00B	52.9%	Stable
Dow Chemical	\$12.06B	\$6.57B	\$5.49B	54.5%	Stable
Merck	\$7.57B	\$3.56B	\$3.99B	46.4%	Stable
Volkswagen	\$8.83B	\$4.90B	\$3.97B	55.2%	Stable
Barilla	\$3.40B	\$1.64B	\$1.77B	49.5%	Stable
Kraft	\$937.3M	\$479.9M	\$457.4M	51.2%	Critical watch

KRAFT CRITICAL WATCH — Q1 FY1992 DOSSIER

CRITICAL: Kraft net NLI after losses \$457.4M. After operating expenses (~\$100M net), net banking profit approaches zero and/or loss territory. One adverse credit development from pending banking loss: WMGP funds Kraft costs and is funding an equity stake. This is both a competitive opportunity and a credit exposure management priority.

Kraft indicator	Q1 FY1991	Q1 FY1992	Q1 FY1992	Trend
Net NLI after losses	\$500M (\$1.58B)	\$433M	\$457.4M	Marginal stabilization
Branches	73	73	73	No rationalization
Brand	53 est.	64 (Q1 FY1992)	64	Flat (no growth)
Deposit rate offered	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	Stop below market — cannot
Service quality	—	—	85	Adjusted measure (no change)
Market share	~4.5% est.	~4.2% est.	3.93%	Declining — structural
Revenue graph (36-mo)	—	—	\$162M	Calculating — slow WFC trend
Profit graph (36-mo trailing)	—	—	NM2M trailing	Watching
Default / gross NLI ratio	—	—	51.2%	Watch (not critical)

Kraft failure scenarios — bond exposure implications
WMGP holds Kraft bonds. If Kraft posts a banking loss and enters distress, bond covenants may be triggered. Monitor (1) Kraft operating expense coverage ratio, (2) any branch closure signaling wider stress. (3) Deposit rate move — if Kraft raises rates above market it signals desperate deposit. Brand (80) positions us as the natural acquirer.

Kraft failure scenario — equity upside
Building equity stake is strategically sound. If Kraft fails as a standalone bank, 73 branches become available. Deposit clients need home bank book could transfer at discount. WMGP's 362 branch network, forces capital ratio (38.86%), and brand (90) positions us as the natural acquirer.

Here is my CFO scenario narrative alongside the visual package:

Q1 FY1992 — Executive Summary

The division delivered a clean quarter. NIM advanced 3bp to 1.49%, deposit expense continued its structural decline to \$50.26B annually, and — most significantly — the default cycle appears to have leveled. Defaults fell 7bps to 1.59%, CCC fell 18bp, and C fell 14bp. The second derivative went negative for the first time in the cycle. This is not noise; it's the credit turn we've been expecting. Dollar defaults held flat at \$1.35B, which at a loan book now approaching \$1.4T annualized represents genuine rate improvement. Conditions 3 and 4 of the capital adequacy framework are now met.

The NIM model — Q2 and Q3 forward
The Q1 impact is modest: the internal 6-month tranche at \$25.03B exits April 8, saving ~\$131M annually. Q2 NIM should print around 1.54%.


The Q3 event is the story. The ~\$19B external maturity cohort at 4.00% clears in a single wave across Q3. This eliminates approximately \$4.78B of annual deposit expense permanently. NIM should see a quarterly improvement 1.8% — exiting Q3 — a 3bp jump in a single quarter. This is the largest single-quarter structural improvement in the division's history and should drive annualized net loan income after losses toward \$28B. This is the internal expectation we manage against. The board gets the Q3 actual when it starts.

Kraft — critical intelligence

The maturing revenue graph showing \$162M and profit at \$28M over 36 months is stark. Kraft is running a banking operation generating less than \$50M in net loan income on a 73-branch footprint, with 51.2% of gross NLI composed by defaults — the worst ratio in the market at their scale. At 2.30% deposit rate they are 10bp below every competitor — they cannot attract deposits at any price. Brand at 64 is structurally impaired. The equity stake we are building is a post-positioned call option on a forced restructuring. The bond position, however, deserves active monitoring — if Kraft's operating losses accelerate, covenant triggers become a real consideration before Q4.

One flag for the Board discussion

The savings account tranche of the internal deposit (\$25.03B, 1.40%) matured October 8, 1991 and is now on savings account rollover basis — it can depart at any time. This is the tranche most aligned with the Q4 FY1992 return commitment. I'd recommend flagging this to the board as an item of transparency rather than waiting for the formal Q4 assessment. Ready to advance to Phase 4 Board simulation on your direction.



Saving accounts maturity date is actually deposit date. Its not overdues we're just able to pull the money out whenever we desire. It earns interest if we keep it. A deposit rather than earning nothing sitting in cash on our balance sheet. I would like to keep the \$25 billion we keep in the bank but if forced by the board per the Q4 FY1992 commitment I will pull it if we can. The loan demand bar is empty but the balance sheet we're able to tell during the Q4 that we were able to originate \$20B in new loans. If deposits continue to be lower than loan book what's our liquidity risk? Can you graph out loan to

Searched project for "Banking liquidity loan to deposit ratio comprehensive strategy"

I have full context. Now let me build the comprehensive liquidity model and Kraft deep dive.

PART I — SAVINGS ACCOUNT MECHANICS CLARIFICATION (LOCKED)


Savings account tranche: \$25.03B at 1.40% (1.40% is the deposit origination date, not a maturity date. Funds earn 1.40% continuously and can be withdrawn at any time. Strategy: reference rate and default decline offset. This is the Phase 2 point we have designed for — waiting on the sustained demand signal.

Loan vs Deposit Position: Current State and FY1992 Baseline	Loan book (Q1 FY1992)	Total deposits reported (Q1 FY1992)	Reported gas loans (excluded deposits)	Organic gas (on internal deposits)
	\$1.400T	\$1.323T	\$77B	\$179.5B
	Costs: \$1.400T	Costs: \$1.323T	Costs: \$77B	Costs: \$179.5B
			Lower needed deposits by 179B	Two organic gas — no internal deposit
Cash on hand	\$467.5B	75.00%	38.86%	\$78.1B
Primary liquidity buffer		All internal deposits	2.0% required minimum	Primary operating cash

PART II — LOAN vs DEPOSIT: FY1992 FULL-YEAR MODEL WITH MATURITY SCHEDULE

Model basis: Loan demand at Q1 FY1992 pace (\$20B/quarter organic). Deposit runoff: organic attrition ~\$19B/quarter baseline, PLUS known maturity events. Internal \$25.03B held intact (savings tranche stays in by preference 6-month tranche exits Apr 8). External cohort exits Q2. Scenario: No Fed rate change, deposit rates held at 2.40%/1.40%.

Quarter	Loan book	Total deposits (reported)	Loan Deposit gap	Cash position	Key event
Q1 FY1992 (actual)	\$1.400B	\$1.323B	-\$77B	\$467B	Baseline
Q2 FY1992 (model)	\$1.408B	\$1.302B	-\$106B	\$440B	6-mo internal tranche exits (Oct 8, 1991)
Q3 FY1992 (model)	\$1.430B	\$1.148B	-\$282B	\$358B	~\$19B external cohort exits (4.00%)
Q4 FY1992 (model)	\$1.438B	\$1.100B	-\$338B	\$370B	Organic attrition only; Mattel exits Apr 1992



PART IV — LIQUIDITY RISK ASSESSMENT: CASH ADEQUACY vs GAP

The gap between loans and deposits is not a liquidity crisis — it is a structural feature of the deliberate runoff strategy. The critical question is whether cash + operating income covers funding needs if there is a sudden shock. At \$467.5B cash and \$78.1B annual loan income, WMGP has exceptional near-term liquidity. The widening gap creates a dependency we are increasingly funded by equity capital rather than deposits. This is by design — not the risk we're worried about. If loan demand accelerates before deposit losses materialize.

Liquidity metric	Q1 FY1992	Q2 (model)	Q3 (model)	Q4 (model)	Assessment
Cash/loan gap coverage	60.7%	33.7%	14.0%	12%	Ample (stronghold)
Annual loan income annual deposit expense	150%	~158%	~159%	~178%	Improving structurally
Equity capital / loan book	38.86%	~39.5%	~41%	~42%	Rising — fortress
Fed facility draw?	No	No	No	No	Backstop intact
Risk of funding shock?	Very low	Very low	Low	Low	Not a concern (low growth)
Risk if loan demand surges suddenly	Low	Low-medium	Medium	Medium	Notional needed to attract deposits

PART V — SCENARIO: LOAN DEMAND BECOMES SUSTAINABLE — RATE PIVOT ECONOMICS

Target state: deposit rate raised to 2.50% (match market), which attracts inflows and begins closing the loan-deposit gap. NIM narrows slightly on the deposit cost side but loan income growth and default decline offset. This is the Phase 2 point we have designed for — waiting on the sustained demand signal.

Rate Pivot Scenario	Current (Q1 FY1992)	Target (2.50%)	Impact
1-yr time deposit rate	2.40%	2.50%	+10bp — attracts new inflows
Savings account rate	1.40%	1.50%	+10bp — retains existing retail
Additional deposit cost per \$100B	—	\$25M/quarter	Acceptable at scale
Net loan spread at 1.5% yield	3.9%	3.0%	+10bp — still strongly profitable
Loan-deposit gap closure (est. inflexion/quarter)	None	+50/-100B/quarter	Gap closes in 2–4 quarters
NIM impact	1.49%	+1.45–1.47%	Modest compression, recovers as banking grows
Trigger required	Sustained loan demand bar — not equity	Deposit compression	Model compression, recovers as banking grows

PART VI — KRAFT CORPORATE ANALYSIS: Q1 FY1992 FULL FINANCIAL DOSSIER

Kraft is a publicly traded company in active distress as a standalone banking operation. WMGP Corp insurance holds Kraft bonds. This dossier covers our entanglement strategy across four dimensions: competitive position, bond exposure, equity accumulation thesis, and acquisition optionality.

KRAFT INCOME STATEMENT — Q1 FY1992

Line item	Last month	YTD (Q1)	Lifetime YTD	Commentary
Operating revenue	\$0	\$0	\$0	Banking subsidiary only — no operating revenue line
Sales expense	\$1.573M	\$4.557M	\$246.7M	Only material operating cost — loans but not enough
Total operating expenses	\$1.573M	\$4.557M	\$246.7M	Entirely salary-driven
Bank net profit	\$3.037M	\$89.962M	\$4.166M	Declining — annualized to ~\$124M at current rate
Operating profit	\$29.444M	\$85.406M	\$3.855M	Declining — annualized to